

## WP 3.1 Staatliche und nichtstaatliche Akteure

### Theories of Bureaucratic Politics: An International Perspective

Dr. Svanhildur Thorvaldsdottir

Oettingenstr. 67, Room 061, 8:30 - 10:00 s.t.

#### Seminar Abstract

International bureaucracies are oftentimes the institutional mechanism through which international policy is both formulated and implemented. And yet, we do not have a strong sense of how they work and the extent to which they parallel national bureaucracies. Do we expect international bureaucracies to be different from national ones? If so, how? What can our existing theories of bureaucratic politics and international organizations explain and where do they fall short? In this seminar, we will examine various theories of bureaucratic politics with a particular eye to their application to international organizations and their policy making processes. Students should emerge from this seminar with a comprehensive understanding of the theories of bureaucratic politics, especially as they apply to international organizations and are encouraged—through a seminar paper or presentation—to explore the linkages between the two in an analysis of their own design. Note that, for this class, it is helpful (but not required) to have some quantitative background as many of the readings will use statistical analysis and/or game-theoretic modeling. The course is designed to complement the seminar “Global Policy-Making in Organizational Fields: What Role for International Bureaucracies?”, but can also be taken independently.

#### Very Important Dates

- **9 April 2018: NO CLASS!** In exchange for canceling class on the first day, I will, however, a) attend the first class of the complementary class to this one (Dr. Ronny Patz’s class, WP3.2: Global Policy Making in Organizational Fields) in case you want to stop by and ask questions, and b) offer an open session to help students brainstorm ideas for papers/presentations sometime during the week of June 4-8.
- **11 April 2018 (Wednesday), 18:00-20:00 c.t.:** Introduction to Dr. Ronny Patz’s class, WP3.2: Global Policy Making in Organizational Fields. If you are interested in taking both this class and that one together, or simply want to meet me or ask questions about the class, I will be there on the 11th and am happy to chat with passersby.
- **2 July 2018 and 9 July 2018: Presentation sessions.** In case we can’t fit everyone who wants to give a presentation into those two dates, we will schedule an additional session at a mutually agreeable time to fit everyone in.
- **2 Sept 2018, 23:59:** Deadline for term papers. Please email as PDF *and* Word/RTF document.

#### Course Requirements

##### Formal requirements:

The formal requirement for this class will be in the form of a paper or a presentation (see details below). Both will require students to engage seriously with the content of the class and attempt to come up with original research that advances the scholarly literature. Students should decide on a topic no later than 11 June 2018 (submitting a paragraph to instructor by email or via hard

copy in class). A tentative bibliography of 15-20 sources used in preparation of the presentation or paper should be submitted a week later (email or hard copy are both accepted).

Regardless of whether students choose a presentation or a paper, the assignment will include the following:

- Identifying an interesting research question (this is harder than you think!);
- Situating the question in the relevant literature and showing how your answer advances that literature;
- Describing a theoretical and methodological approach for the project.

**Presentation-specific requirements:** Those students choosing to do a presentation will present a comprehensive and coherent *research design* as their assignment. Note that you do not need to actually do the analysis you propose; however, you must include all three items above in your presentation, and demonstrate that your project is feasible (this part is harder than it sounds—be forewarned!). Consider this is a great opportunity to test-run an idea for a Master’s thesis. Presentations should last 20-25 minutes and will be followed by 5-10 minutes of Q&A from your fellow students and instructor. Grading is based on substance and style of presentation and discussion.

**Paper-specific requirements:** Students choosing to write a term paper for this class should write an *original research paper* conforming to the requirements outlined in the Prüfungsordnung for political science. The topic should be on a question which relates to the topic of the class, broadly defined. Students should be prepared to present *very briefly* (ca. 5 minutes) on their topic at some point during the semester. Grading, however, will be based only on the final paper to be submitted by 2 September 2018, 23:59 (email as PDF and as Word/RTF).

### **Informal requirements:**

This Master’s level seminar relies almost exclusively on original research, mostly in the form of journal articles. You will be exposed to some of the canonical literature on bureaucratic politics and we will attempt to bridge what I consider a divide between that, on the one hand, and the literature on international organizations, on the other. This will be a collaborative exercise, and one which requires *considerable engagement from students* (or we will all die of boredom).

Many of the articles you will read are quite complex. While *I do expect you to have done the readings* ahead of time and come prepared to discuss them, I *do not* expect you to always understand everything. Comments that begin with, “I had no idea what the author was saying about . . .” or “this part made no sense to me” are always welcome. If you didn’t understand something, chances are you are not the only one so you should always feel free to speak up.

Although there are no formal mathematical prerequisites for this class, you will find it helpful to know how to read a regression table and even more helpful to have had some exposure to game theory. However, I will expect no more from you than command of high-school level algebra and a *willingness to learn* new tools and applications. If you feel like you are struggling with the material, please do not hesitate to let me know.

## Course Schedule

**9 April 2018 — NO CLASS**

**16 April 2018**

Topic: Bureaucratic politics: What is it and why/how do we study it?

1. Shepsle, K. (2010). *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions*. W.W. Norton, 2nd edition: 407-442.
2. Moe, T. M. (1989). *Can the Government Govern?*, chapter The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, pages 267–329. Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C
3. Bendor, J., Glazer, A., and Hammond, T. (2001). Theories of Delegation. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 4(1):235–269 (*skim*)

**23 April 2018**

Topic: International Organizations: What are they and why/how do we study them?

1. Vaubel, R. (1986). A Public Choice Approach to International Organization. *Public Choice*, 51(1):39–57
2. Keohane, R. O. (1982). The Demand for International Regimes. *International Organization*, 36(2):325–355
3. Barnett, M. N. and Finnemore, M. (1999). The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations. *International Organization*, 53(4):699–732

**30 April 2018**

Topic: Explaining delegation I

1. Huber, J. D. and Shipan, C. R. (2002). *Deliberate Discretion?: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1 and 2.
2. Bendor, J. and Meirowitz, A. (2004). Spatial Models of Delegation. *American Political Science Review*, 98(2):293–310
3. Epstein, D. and O'Halloran, S. (1994). Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion. *American Journal of Political Science*, 38(3):697–722

**7 May 2018**

Topic: Explaining delegation II

1. Gailmard, S. (2009). Multiple Principals and Oversight of Bureaucratic Policy-Making. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 21(2):161–186
2. Ting, M. M. (2003). A strategic theory of bureaucratic redundancy. *American Journal of Political Science*, 47(2):274–292
3. Volden, C. (2002). Delegating power to bureaucracies: Evidence from the states. *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization*, 18(1):187–220

**14 May 2018**

Topic: Delegation to International Organizations

1. Vaubel, R. (2006). Principal-Agent Problems in International Organizations. *The Review of International Organizations*, 1(2):125–138
2. Hawkins, D. G., Lake, D. A., Nielson, D. L., and Tierney, M. J. (2006). *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Chapters 1 and 2.
3. Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., and Snidal, D. (2001). The Rational Design of International Institutions. *International Organization*, 55(4):761-799

## 28 May 2018

Topic: Domestic bureaucracies I

1. McCubbins, M. D. and Schwartz, T. (1984). Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms. *American Journal of Political Science*, pages 165–179
2. McCubbins, M. D., Noll, R. G., and Weingast, B. R. (1989). Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies. *Virginia Law Review*, pages 431–482
3. Selin, J. L. (2015). What Makes an Agency Independent? *American Journal of Political Science*, 59(4):971–987

## 4 June 2018

Topic: Domestic bureaucracies II

1. Gailmard, S. and Patty, J. W. (2007). Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(4):873–889
2. Prendergast, C. (2007). The Motivation and Bias of Bureaucrats. *American Economic Review*, 97(1):180–196
3. Ujhelyi, G. (2014). Civil Service Rules and Policy Choices: Evidence from US State Governments. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 6(2):338–80

## 11 June 2018

Topic: International bureaucracies I

1. Johnson, T. and Urpelainen, J. (2014). International Bureaucrats and the Formation of Intergovernmental Organizations: Institutional Design Discretion Sweetens the Pot. *International Organization*, 68(01):177–209
2. Johnson, T. (2014). *Organizational Progeny: Why Governments are Losing Control over the Proliferating Structures of Global Governance*. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Chapters 1-4.

## 18 June 2018

Topic: International bureaucracies II

1. Kleine, M. (2013). Trading Control: National Fiefdoms in International Organizations. *International Theory*, 5(03):321–346
2. Graham, E. R. (2014). International Organizations as Collective Agents: Fragmentation and the Limits of Principal Control at the World Health Organization. *European Journal of International Relations*, 20(2):366–390
3. Copelovitch, M. S. (2010). Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending. *International Studies Quarterly*, 54(1):49–77

## 25 June 2018

Topic: International bureaucracies III

1. Thorvaldsdottir, S. (2016). How to Win Friends and Influence the UN: Donor Influence on the United Nations' Bureaucracy. Working paper
2. Novosad, P. and Werker, E. (2017). Who Runs the International System? Nationality and Leadership in the United Nations Secretariat. *The Review of International Organizations*, pages 1–33
3. Vaubel, R., Dreher, A., and Soylu, U. (2007). Staff Growth in International Organizations: A Principal-Agent Problem? An Empirical Analysis. *Public Choice*, 133(3-4):275–295

## 2 July 2018 / 9 July 2018

Student presentations.