Working papers
How to Win Friends and Influence the UN: Donor Influence on the United Nations' Bureaucracy
It is well-known that states seek to get their nationals hired into international organizations (IOs), but the reasons behind this are less well-understood. This paper argues that one benefit that states derive is that the more nationals a state has on the staff of an IO, the more similar the policy preferences of that agency become to the state's. Not all states, however, have an equal ability to get their nationals hired by IOs. Examining an original dataset on UN staff nationalities, this paper demonstrates that major donors to voluntarily-funded UN development agencies have a larger number of their nationals on staff than do similar non-major donors. It further shows that those agencies' aid portfolios look more similar to countries that have a large number of their nationals on the agency's staff. Interestingly, this effect is driven not by those countries that existing theories of informal influence would lead us to believe should be most influential---namely the G5---but rather by other, less powerful, bilateral donors. This suggests that a much larger number of countries can informally influence IOs than is usually thought.
Behave or else? Aid and voting on the UN Security Council
Recent scholarship has shown that states holding a temporary seat on the United Nations Security Council receive higher levels of aid from the United States. This has led to the question: are states being bribed for their votes? The results from the existing literature support an affirmative answer to this question. Using recently available data on votes in the UN Security Council, I address this question more directly than previous studies have been able to. I find that the US does use financial incentives to induce states to vote with them on the Security Council. However, on average, the US does not seem to punish states (or reward them) for their voting behavior. This suggests that the US may not be bribing for votes so much as buying goodwill from the elected members of the Security Council. These findings add greater nuance to the current analysis of vote-buying within international organizations, and can also serve as a starting point for further research into the behavior of the members of the UN Security Council.
Works in progress
Driving Pollution: Specifying and Estimating the Environmental Kuznets Curve (with Lawrence Rothenberg)
Draft available upon request
International Public Administrations and the Perception of Crisis: The Case of UNRWA and Palestine Refugees (with Ronny Patz and Klaus Goetz)
Draft available upon request
IO Bureaucracies Between Resource Mobilization and Problem-Solving: The Case of the UNHCR (with Ronny Patz)
Draft available upon request
Ideology and Donations to the UN System
Draft available upon request
Are Goodwill Ambassadors Good for Business? The Impact of Celebrities on IO fundraising (with Rabia Malik)
Ideology at the UN: Estimating Agency Ideal Points
How to Win Friends and Influence the UN: Donor Influence on the United Nations' Bureaucracy
It is well-known that states seek to get their nationals hired into international organizations (IOs), but the reasons behind this are less well-understood. This paper argues that one benefit that states derive is that the more nationals a state has on the staff of an IO, the more similar the policy preferences of that agency become to the state's. Not all states, however, have an equal ability to get their nationals hired by IOs. Examining an original dataset on UN staff nationalities, this paper demonstrates that major donors to voluntarily-funded UN development agencies have a larger number of their nationals on staff than do similar non-major donors. It further shows that those agencies' aid portfolios look more similar to countries that have a large number of their nationals on the agency's staff. Interestingly, this effect is driven not by those countries that existing theories of informal influence would lead us to believe should be most influential---namely the G5---but rather by other, less powerful, bilateral donors. This suggests that a much larger number of countries can informally influence IOs than is usually thought.
Behave or else? Aid and voting on the UN Security Council
Recent scholarship has shown that states holding a temporary seat on the United Nations Security Council receive higher levels of aid from the United States. This has led to the question: are states being bribed for their votes? The results from the existing literature support an affirmative answer to this question. Using recently available data on votes in the UN Security Council, I address this question more directly than previous studies have been able to. I find that the US does use financial incentives to induce states to vote with them on the Security Council. However, on average, the US does not seem to punish states (or reward them) for their voting behavior. This suggests that the US may not be bribing for votes so much as buying goodwill from the elected members of the Security Council. These findings add greater nuance to the current analysis of vote-buying within international organizations, and can also serve as a starting point for further research into the behavior of the members of the UN Security Council.
Works in progress
Driving Pollution: Specifying and Estimating the Environmental Kuznets Curve (with Lawrence Rothenberg)
Draft available upon request
International Public Administrations and the Perception of Crisis: The Case of UNRWA and Palestine Refugees (with Ronny Patz and Klaus Goetz)
Draft available upon request
IO Bureaucracies Between Resource Mobilization and Problem-Solving: The Case of the UNHCR (with Ronny Patz)
Draft available upon request
Ideology and Donations to the UN System
Draft available upon request
Are Goodwill Ambassadors Good for Business? The Impact of Celebrities on IO fundraising (with Rabia Malik)
Ideology at the UN: Estimating Agency Ideal Points
